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Billboards and other outdoor advertising signs are adjuncts of
trade and commerce. They have a proper and necessary place in the
industrial and commercial areas of the country. Reputable sign
companies and advertisers have long recognized that signs are out
of place in residential, scenic or recreational areas, and have in-
cluded in their association codes of ethics prohibitions against the
erection of signs in or adjacent to such areas.1
No useful purpose would be served by a detailed examination
of the many and conflicting decisions of courts of last resort on the
validity of prohibitions and restrictions on outdoor signs. Two prin-
cipal lines of conflicting decisions will be noticed, but, in general,
this discussion will be limited to the rights of property owners,
advertisers and sign companies to erect and maintain outdoor ad-
vertising signs, including billboards, in the business, industrial and
commercial areas of Colorado.
Colorado now has a weak, unenforced and unenforceable road-
side sign law.2 Irresponsible advertisers and sign companies can and
do erect roadside signs, often without permission of the landowner,
and disappear before their acts are discovered. The signs they erect,
unless removed at the property owner's expense, remain, unattend-
ed, to rust and decay and become offensive to passers-by. There are
areas along our highways, commonly called "sign patches," in which
signs are so numerous as to be worthless because each detracts from
1 Public Policy - Outdoor Advertising Association of America, Inc. (1938). Includes regulations
prohibiting advertising structures within rights-of-way of public roads or upon private property with-
out consent of the owner; upon the inside of curves or in the vicinity of -railroad crossings or road
intersections so as to obstruct the view; or which obstruct beautiful vistas or panoramic view of
natural beauties of rural landscapes; or which encroach upon an historical monument, shrine, relic,
object, or place; or which intrude upon the beauty and dignity of approaches or entrances to notional,
state, or county parks, or on residential streets, facing parks, or on residential streets where resent-
ment of reasonable-minded persons would be justified; or which are not in good physical condition.
These regulations also prohibit signs on rocks, trees, fences, or barricades. They also condemn illegal,
immoral, false, misleading, or deceptive signs.




the value of the others. Signs which offend the sense of propriety of
the viewer are worthless as advertising. Responsible advertisers
and advertising companies have long sought legislation to remedy
this situation,3 realizing the harm that is being done to the
industry by unruly and unlawful elements. A workable, enforceable
law is a necessity, but differences as to the type of law required
have so far proved irreconcilable.
I. CONFLICTING DECISIONS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
There are two principal lines of decisions on billboards and out-
door advertising signs. One line considers billboards as offensive
land uses and rules that signs may be drastically regulated, pro-
hibited, or taxed out of existence. The other line of decisions
declares that outdoor advertising signs are lawful and may be
regulated under the police power, but cannot be prohibited.
a.) The Minority View:
Signs are Tolerated, But may be Prohibited.
Illustrations of the first line of decisions are found in a number
of cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. In these cases,
constitutional objections were raised that the regulation or law in
question authorized the taking of private property for public or
private use without compensation, and constituted a denial of due
process of law and the equal protection of the laws.
In Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago,4 the United States Supreme
Court approved the placing of billboards in a classification separate
from that of other commercial and industrial structures on the
ground that they were offensive uses and in the same class as
garages and saloons. This case went beyond the question involved,
namely, the validity of a municipal regulation prohibiting billboards
in the residential areas of Chicago. Later, the same court in St. Louis
Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis,5 decided that if a city desired to
discourage billboards by taxing them at an exorbitant and discrim-
inatory rate, there was nothing to hinder it from so doing.
Still later the same court, in Packer Corp. v. Utah,6 affirmed a
decision of the Supreme Court of Utah which had approved a statute
prohibiting tobacco advertising on billboards, placards and car
cards, but permitting such advertising when contained in a news-
paper or magazine, or on the front of the place of business of a
tobacco dealer. Speaking of billboards and car cards, the court said,
"Advertisements of this sort are constantly before the eyes of ob-
servers on the streets and in street cars to be seen without the
exercise of choice or volition on their part."T This is the "captive
audience" argument.
The reasoning in which the Court indulged to support the dis-
tinction between such signs merits particular comment because it
is contrary to everyday experience. No one is compelled to look at
3 E.g., House Bill 469, 42nd Gen. Assembly of Colo., 1st Sess. (1959). Outdoor advertising firms
and sign contractors in Colorado collaborated in the drafting of this bill. It died in committee. In
general, this bill required persons erecting and maintaining outdoor signs to be bonded and licensed,
and required annual permits for all outdoor signs. It limited the areas in which such signs could be
erected, and required visibility distances between signs so as to eliminate sign patches. It especially
prohibited signs in scenic, recreational and residential areas, with exemptions for charitable, religious,
officialand similar signs.
4 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
5249 U.S. 269 (1919).
6285 U.S. 105 (1932).
7 Id. at 110.
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billboards. We pass them every day without being aware of their
existence. But even if the court's statements were true, where do
billboards threaten or contravene public peace, public health, public
morals, and public safety? '
In this same decision, the court declared, "In the case of news-
papers and magazines, there must be some seeking by the one who
is to see and read the advertisement."8 Everyday practice indicates
the Court had its facts twisted. In most newspapers and magazines,
the reader must search through the advertisements to find the news
items. Again, the Court says, "The radio can be turned off, but not
so the billboard or street car placard."9 No one turns off a radio or
television in the midst of an interesting program to avoid seeing or
hearing the customary mid-program commercial.
In Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick,l0 the Supreme Court of Vermont said:
"Ostensibly located on private property, the real and
sole value of the billboard is its proximity to the public
thoroughfares. Hence, we can see that the regulation of
billboards and their restriction is not so much a regulation
of private property as it is a regulation of the use of the
streets and other public thoroughfares.""
Notably absent from the decisions supporting the "proximity
argument" is any discussion on the origin or validity of the assumed
superior right of the highway traveler to have the lands abutting
8 Id. at 110.
9 d at 110.
10 113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527 (1942).
11 Id. at 67, 30 A.2d at 529.
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such highways restricted in use so as to please his individual tastes.
Except in scenic, recreational, and similar areas, the primary pur-
pose of a highway is to facilitate travel, and not to please the
aesthete. There are few industries or businesses whose value is not
in part, at least, measured by their proximity to arteries of public
transportation. Yet, under this "proximity argument" and by pre-
tending to regulate highway traffic, every filling station or motel
could be subjected to discriminatory treatment or even prohibited
since, like billboards, their value depends upon travel on public
streets and highways. Based upon the "proximity argument" and
under the guise of regulating sidewalks, all stores on Sixteenth
Street in Denver could be compelled to board up their show win-
dows because the value of show windows lies solely in their prox-
imity to public sidewalks. The "proximity doctrine" has no relation
to the public peace, health, safety, morals, or welfare.1 2
A further argument in support of the prohibition of roadside
advertising signs is that they distract the attention of drivers of
automobiles, and so endanger public safety. A California case, Los
Angeles v. Barrett,1" involved the validity of an ordinance prohibit-
ing outdoor advertising signs visible from a freeway, which created
a hazard to vehicles or endangered the safety of persons on the free-
way. Proponents of the ordinance offered proof regarding the fre-
quency of traffic, the distance in seconds between cars, and the
distance in seconds required to recognize a sign. This proof was
intfoduced to support the contention that by the time a driver of
an automobile read a billboard and turned his attention again to the
road ahead, he would have collided with the car in front of him.
This line of reasoning, sustained by the California court, is open to
serious criticism. For instance, it is common practice for automobile
drivers to keep their eyes on the road and leave the observation of
roadside signs and scenery to passengers. The reasoning in this case
falsely assumes that while the driver is scanning the sign, the car
ahead is illegally slowing down or stopping in the roadway. This
decision also presumes that the driver scanning the sign has no
peripheral vision, which, experience teaches us, is seldom the case.
The extent to which some jurisdictions have gone to prohibit
or restrict outdoor signs is perhaps best illustrated by Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc. v. New York,'1 4 which concerned a traffic regula-
tion prohibiting any advertising vehicle from being operated on city
streets, but permitting business notices on delivery vehicles engaged
in the business of the owner. This regulation was sustained not be-
cause of its relation to public peace, health or safety, but on the basis
of whose truck was carrying the advertising.
The foregoing decisions are numbered among the more prom-
inent anti-sign authorities. They illustrate how outdoor signs were
first removed by court decree from the general class of commercial
and industrial structures and relegated to a class of activities exist-
ing by sufferance which can claim no constitutional protection.
They further demonstrate how signs themselves were then divided
into signs erected as a part of the advertising business and signs
12 Curran Bill Posting and Distributing Co. v. Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 107 Pac. 261 (1910).
13 153 Col. App. 2d 776, 315 P.2d 503 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
14 336 U.S. 106 (1948).
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accessory to a particular business-the latter being tolerated and
the former being prohibited.
b.) The Majority Rule:
Signs May Be Regulated But Not Prohibited Under the Police Power
The second line of decisions sustains the regulation of outdoor
signs and billboards under the police power, but condemns the
prohibition of such signs. This is the majority rule and is followed
by the Supreme Court of Colorado.
In 1954, the Ohio case of Central Outdoor Advertising Co. v.
Village of Evendale,15 declared unconstitutional a village ordinance
providing that no advertising sign or billboard should be erected
within the limits of the village except to advertise the business or
product of the owner or occupant of the premises on which the sign
was located. The ordinance stated that it was enacted as an emer-
gency measure, necessary to the public safety and welfare. It
announced it was made necessary because signs and billboards
constituted a menace to the lives of travelers on the highways, by
diverting the attention of motor vehicle drivers. The court had this
to say:
"With few exceptions, the rule is well established that
any law is unwarranted and invalid, which prohibits alto-
gether an occupation or business which does not necessarily
injure the public in that it is detrimental to the health,
safety or general welfare. In other words, no trade or occu-
pation can be prohibited absolutely unless it is inherently a
nuisance or has become such. Billboard advertising is not
inherently a nuisance, whether used as* accessory and inci-
dental to the main business conducted on the premises, or
is the exclusive use to which the premises are put."16
The Ohio court also stated that outdoor advertising under the
Ohio code was classified as a business use and permitted in all dis-
tricts zoned for industry, business, trade or agriculture; that the
ordinance prohibiting outdoor advertising except for accessory uses,
gave no specific reason for the inhibition, unless the reason could be
found in the term "safety," as used in the preamble of the ordinance.
The court found evidence that these billboards and signs are located
on property so near the highway that they may be seen by those
traveling on the highway. There was also evidence as to the great
amount of traffic on the highways of the defendant village. The
court mentioned the strong presumption in favor of the validity of
an ordinance enacted under a police power, but then held:
"[C]omplete prohibition throughout a municipality of
a conduct of a legitimate business must be based upon the
fact that such business is inherently a nuisance and a detri-
ment to safety, or has become so. A particular business,
recognized by the statutory law of the state as a legitimate
business, cannot be made a nuisance by mere legislative fiat
of the council of a municipality."' 7
The court said there Was no substantial reason for declaring
15 54 Ohio Op. 354, 124 N.E.2d 189 (C.P. 1954).
16 Id. at 356, 124 N.E.2d at 193.
17 Id. at 357, 124 N.E.2d at 194.
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billboards and signs, other than those advertising products manu-
factured or sold on the premises, such a menace to life as to require
their prohibition, and concluded:
"Regulations of a business under the police power must
be impartial and must have a real and substantial relation
to the safety, health, morals or general welfare of the
public. This limitation upon the power to regulate obvious-
ly applies to a prohibition of a legitimate business; in fact,
the restrictions upon the power to prohibit are even more
stringent than those upon the power to regulate."'18
An ordinance of the Village of Colonie, New York, prohibiting
the erection of billboards within the village, was declared to be
invalid and an improper exercise of the statutory powers conferred
upon the village trustees to enact ordinances necessary for the pro-
tection of property and life.19 In another New York case, 20 an ordi-
nance of the City of Troy, New York, was challenged. The Troy
ordinance differed from the ordinance in the Village of Colonie case
in that it excepted signs advertising the sale of the property upon
which placed, or of merchandise sold on the premises, but it pro-
hibited all other signs. It was declared void on its face, on the
ground that it was not an attempt by zoning to exclude billboards
from localities where they might mar natural scenery or distract
travelers. The Court of Appeals of New York stated that even
though it be assumed that outdoor advertising on private property
might without compensation be restricted for aesthetic reasons
alone, this prohibition without any definition of the structures pro-
scribed or other standard of regulation, cannot be sustained con-
sistently with constitutional principles.
In 1956, a New York appellate decision 2 1 ruled that. a statute
which prohibited outdoor advertising signs other than those adver-
tising the business conducted on the premises or concerning the sale
of such premises, or which were more than ten (10) feet in height
or within 500 feet of the Brooklyn Battery Bridge, or its approaches
or connections, was unconstitutional. The court noted that "the
statute does not prohibit all signs, but only those referring to a
subject 'other than actually conducted on the premises or to the sale
or rent of such premises'." The court stated that the allegation that
such signs imperiled public peace, safety and health was refuted by
the very exceptions recited in the statute; that while a ban on all
signs might be said to have some reasonable connection with the
police power of the state, nevertheless, since certain signs were
permitted regardless of their size or height or potentialities for dis-
traction, it was apparent that the prohibition was based on factors
that had no relation to the public health. The court concluded that,
"A prohibition which cannot be equated with the evil to be remedied
is arbitrary and unreasonable."
It is pertinent here to point out that the dicta so often encoun-
tered in decisions mentioning the baneful effects of outdoor signs
upon traffic safety have little or no basis in fact. David M. Baldwin,
18 Id. at 358, 124 N.E.2d at 194-95.
19 Ruth v. Incorporated Village of Colonie, 198 Misc. 608, 99 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
20 Mid-State Advertising Corp. v. Bond, 274 N.Y. 82, 8 N.E.2d 286 (1937).
21 Tri-Borough Bridge and Tunnel Authority v. B. Crystal & Son, 2 App. Div. 2d 37, 153 N.Y.S.2d
387 (1956), aff'd 2 N.Y.2d 961, 142 N.E.2d 426 (1957).
DICTA
NOVEMBER-DE EMBER 1959
Executive Secretary of the Institute of Traffic Engineers, in an
article entitled "Frankly Speaking" in the official publication of that
Institute, stated in part: 22
"No one denies that a billboard located at an inter-
section or a curve so as to obstruct the view, or a sign which
confuses a driver by its message, color or illumination is a
hazard. On the other hand, there are no facts which show
any hazard resulting from advertising signs in general.
Attempts by opponents of outdoor advertising to assume
such a relationship are unfair and are not condoned by
engineers, who will insist on seeing evidence of any such
relationship.
"This does not mean that traffic engineers favor out-
door advertising. Undoubtedly some do-but certainly
many do not. Their reasons for opposing billboards, if this
is their position, are those of aesthetics or personal opinion,
however, not because there are facts about accidents.
"It is unfortunate that the billboard arguments have
been identified in so many minds as ones which can be re-
solved on the basis of traffic safety. In effect, the oppo-
nents of billboards have tied their case to the coat-tails of
safety. This misleading identification has been confusing to
the general public, which is not aware of the facts of the
case."
And in Central Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Evendale,23 the
Ohio court stated: "There is no evidence of injuries caused to per-
sons or property by such signs."
Uncontroverted testimony in the case of General Outdoor Ad-
vertising Co. v. Harter2 4 stated there was no record of a traffic
accident caused by an outdoor advertising sign.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in the case of Haller Sign Works
v. Physical Culture Training School,25 stated: "There is nothing
inherently dangerous to the health or safety of the public in struc-
tures that are properly erected for advertising purposes." In that
case, the Illinois court also said:
"Again, it is to be observed that the application of this
statute is limited to structures placed within five hundred
feet of boulevards and public parks. If the placing of such
structures within five hundred feet of boulevards and pub-
lic parks is dangerous or otherwise detrimental to the public
welfare, it is difficult to see why the same structures would
not be equally so if placed within the same distance from
any other public street or public grounds.
'26
In contrast with the line of decisions prohibiting or drastically
restricting billboards, segregating them from the general classifica-
tion of commercial structures and declaring they exist only by suf-
22 27 Traffic Engineering 311 (1954).
23 54 Ohio Op. 354, 357, 124 N.E.2d 189, 194 (C.P. 1954).
24 No. B.19469, Dist. Ct. City and County of Denver, Colo., Sept. 25, 1958.
25249 Ill. 436, 94 N.E. 920 (1911).
26 Id. at 442, 94 N.E. at 922-23.
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ferance, is a recent case in which the Supreme Court of Illinois
said: 2
7
"Statutory classifications can only be sustained where
there are real differences between the classes, and where
the selection of the particular class, as distinguished from
others, is reasonably related to the evils to be remedied by
the statute or ordinance. .. . Similarly, an ordinance cannot
be sustained which permits designated uses of property
while excluding other uses not significantly different."
II. THE COLORADO DECISIONS
As hereinafter shown, the Colorado Supreme Court has fol-
lowed the majority rule that outdoor advertising signs may be
regulated, but not prohibited, under the police power. The following
cases will also show that while our Supreme Court has time and
again approved the validity of proper zoning laws,28 it has con-
demned discrimination in zoning codes between outdoor signs and
other commercial structures in industrial and commercial districts.
29
Colorado statutes empower municipalities to adopt zoning ordi-
nances.30 These statutes also authorize county commissioners to
adopt county zoning resolutions for the unincorporated areas of the
county.31 Zoning resolutions or ordinances, by creating zoning dis-
tricts specifying the uses permitted in such districts, exclude other
27 Chicago v. Sachs, 1 Ill. 2d 342, 115 N.E.2d 762 (1953).
28 DiSalle v. Giggal, 128 Colo. 208, 261 P.2d 499 (1953); Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 81 Colo.
344, 255 Pac. 443 (1927).
29 General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Goodman, 128 Colo. 344, 262 P.2d 261 (1953).
30 Colo. Rev. Stat. ch. 139, art. 60 (1953).
31 Colo. Rev. Stat. ch. 106, art. 2 (1953).
SComplete Judicial Bond Service
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uses.3 2 The constitutionality of such ordinances and zoning resolu-
tions has been upheld.3 3 In this discussion, we are concerned with
the prohibition, rather than the regulation, of outdoor advertising
signs, including billboards, under the police power. We are also
concerned with discriminations against outdoor advertising signs
and billboards, or between outdoor advertising signs and billboards,
under the police power or in zoning ordinances or resolutions.
Probably the basic decision in Colorado concerning outdoor
signs and billboards was handed down in 1910 in the case of Curran
Bill Posting & Distributing Co. v. Denver.3 4 This case involved an
ordinance prohibiting billboards or advertising structures without a
permit from the fire and police board of Denver. It prohibited a
billboard or advertising structure any portion of which was within
10 feet of any street or alley line, or was more than 25 feet in length
or 8 feet in height, or was within 10 feet of any building. The
following quotations are from the opinion in that case:
"The natural right, one may have, to use his own prop-
erty as he wills, is subject always to the limitation that in
its use, others shall not be injured. That which is hurtful
to the comfort, safety and welfare of society may always be
prohibited, under the inherent or plenary power of the
state, notwithstanding the incidental inconvenience of loss
individuals may suffer thereby.
3 5
"It is equally true, however, that the owner of property
has the right to put it to any use he desires, provided in so
doing, he does not imperil or threaten harm to others.
Legislative restrictions of the use of property are imposed
only upon the theory of necessity; that is, they are neces-
sary for the safety, health, comfort or general welfare of
the public.
'" 36
"If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted
to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public
safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects,
or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the funda-
mental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and
thereby give effect to the Constitution.
3 7
The court commented that no case had been cited authorizing the
taking of a man's property because his tastes were not those of his
neighbor, and then stated:
"The restrictions imposed are not against the material,
the height, the length, nor the location of the structure, but
solely as means of advertisement. It prohibits such struc-
tures without regard to their being safe or sanitary....
In what way can the erection of safe structures, of proper
material, within certain limits, for advertising purposes,
endanger the public health or safety any more than like
structures erected and used for other lawful purposes? If
the owner has the right to erect upon the lot line buildings
32 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code, Sec. 612.1 - .17.
33 DiSolle v. Giggal, 128 Colo. 208, 261 P.2d 499 (1953); Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 81 Colo.
344, 255 Pac. 443 (1927).
34 47 Colo. 221, 107 Pac. 261 (1910).
35 Id. at 224, 107 Poe. at 263.
36 Id. at 225, 107 Pac. at 263.
37 Id. at 226, 107 Pac. at 264.
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or other structures of proper material, in a substantial
manner, as he undoubtedly has, it is certainly an unwar-
ranted invasion of his rights to prohibit the erection or use
of such structures for proper advertising purposes. "38
In Willison v. Cooke,39 the court stated that a store building in
a residential section, while not desirable from an aesthetic point of
view, could not be prohibited. Such a prohibition would have no
relation to any object which the municipality in the exercise of its
police power might legally accomplish. The court, in deciding that
such restrictions violated Sections 3, 15 and 25 of the Colorado Bill
of Rights,40 said:
"One of the essential elements of property is the right
to its unrestricted use and enjoyment; and as we have seen,
that use cannot be interfered with beyond what is necessary
to provide for the welfare and general security of the public.
Enforcing the provisions of the ordinances in question does
not deprive the petitioner of title to his lots .... He would
still have the power to dispose of them; but, although there
would be no actual or physical invasion of his possession,
he would be deprived of the right to put them to a legiti-
mate use, which does not injure the public, and this, without
compensation or any provision therefor. This would clearly
deprive him of his property without compensation, and
without due process of law .... 41
While the Curran42 and Willison43 cases were decided prior to
the advent of municipal 44 or county zoning45 in Colorado, the Su-
preme Court of Colorado in Cross v. Bilett,46 involving the validity
of a portion of a Denver zoning ordinance, stated:
"[W]e do not challenge the rule declared in the Curran
and Willison cases. In the absence of a zoning ordinance,
where the right of a municipality is strictly limited to the
general police power for protection of the public health
and welfare, it is commonly held that only such buildings
and occupations may be restricted as are shown to be in-
jurious under such police power; . . . In the absence of
zoning ordinances, restrictions as to use of property are
viewed with hostility by the courts.
47
Again, in 1953, in the case of General Outdoor Advertising Co. v.
Goodman,48 which questioned the validity of a portion of an Arapa-
hoe County zoning resolution,49 the court held:
38 Id. at 228, 107 Pac. at 264.
39 54 Colo. 320, 130 Pac. 828 (1913).
40 Colo. Const. art. II.
41 54 Colo. at 330, 130 Pac. at 832.
42 47 Colo. 221, 107 Pac. 261 (1910).
43 54 Colo. 320, 130 Pac. 828 (1913).
44 Colo. Sess. Laws 1923, at 649.
45 Colo. Sess. Laws 1939, at 294.
46 122 Colo. 278, 221 P.2d 923 (1950).
47 Id. at 284, 221 P.2d at 926.
48 128 Colo. 344, 262 P.2d 261 (1953).
49 Arapahoe County Zoning Resolution, 6, as amended October 23, 1950, reads:
"11. Signs, when approved by the combined action of the Arapahoe County Board of Ad-
justment and the Board of County Commissioners of Arapahoe County."
In General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Goodman, 128 Colo. 344, 346, 262 P.2d 261, 262 (1953)
the court observed:
"To make easy reading in the discussion of the matters herein presented, it is well to ob-
serve at the outset that for some reason, unexplained, the county commissioners singled out
'signs' as objects for different and specific treatment .... Curiosity is naturally aroused
when it is seen that 'signs' are the only commercial structures falling within this unusual pro-
cedure."
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"It would be difficult to find a more direct grant of
arbitrary discretion and unlimited power than is here vest-
ed, and, of course, the freedom to use such power as it
might relate to lawful enterprises and the uses of property,
permits uncontrolled regulation and dictatorial powers of
commercial and industrial enterprises in the area involved
and therefore is repugnant to the Constitution of the United
States and that of the State of Colorado.
'50
This case is noteworthy for several reasons. It is the latest pro-
nouncement of the Colorado Supreme Court on this subject. It is
based upon a zoning code and not upon the general police power.
Contrary to the decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court in Cusack v.
Chicago5' and Packer Corp. v. Utah,52 the Colorado Supreme Court
in this case recognized the erection of advertising signs as a lawful
enterprise,53 thus affirming the position taken in the Curran case,
wherein billboards were classed with "like structures erected and
used for other lawful purposes.
54
Under the Goodman decision, 55 there was at least a chance that
the Arapahoe County Commissioners and Board of Adjustment
would refrain from arbitrary action and grant sign permits where
proper. Hence, it would seem that any statutory prohibition of out-
door signs under the police powers of the state, such as that pro-
posed by the amendments to the Federal Interstate Highway Law56
would be invalid. Under this amendment to the Federal Interstate
Highway Law, the prohibition is absolute; it cannot be tempered by
official action. It prohibits all roadside signs with very few excep-
tions and it discriminates between signs.
57
In the Goodman case, the Supreme Court of Colorado adhered
to the general law which requires that regulation of lawful busi-
nesses cannot be had unless the rules are prescribed by the legis-
lature. The supreme court stated:
"The danger . . . lies in the fact that there are no uni-
form rules prescribed, thereby making it possible for arbi-
trary and capricious discriminations, depending upon no
qualifications whatever other than the unrestrained and
unregulated arbitrary will of the members of the two
boards . . ."58
This decision follows Walsh v. Denver,59 LaJunta v. Heath,60 People
v. Stanley,61 and May v. People.2 In the last case, the Colorado
Court of Appeals said:
"If the city council can say that certain individuals
may pursue a certain vocation and that other individuals
of the same class, of equal repute and citizens of that com-
munity, shall not, then the one great principle conferred
upon the citizens of the United States, to wit; the right to
50 128 Colo. 344, 348, 262 P.2d 261, 262. (Emphasis added.)
51 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
52 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
53 128 Colo. at 348, 262 P.2d at 263.
54 47 Colo. 221, 228, 107 Pac. 261, 264 (1910).
55 128 Colo. 344, 262 P.2d 261 (1953).
56 Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. §131 (1958).
57 Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. 5131 (a) (1958).
58 128 Colo. at 349, 262 P.2d at 263.
59 11 Cola. App. 523, 53 Pac. 458 (1898).
60 38 Colo. 372, 88 Pac. 459 (1906).
61 90 Colo. 315, 9 P.2d 288 (1932).
62 1 Colo. App. 157, 27 Pac. 1010 (1891).
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pursue any lawful business or vocation in any manner not
inconsistent with the equal rights of others which may in-
crease their prosperity or develop their faculties so as to
give them the highest enjoyment is disallowed.
'6 3
In each of these cases, public officials or the legislative body
were given the right without any rules to guide them, to grant
or to withhold certain privileges or licenses to engage in lawful
businesses. The cases indicate that no sign legislation can be adopt-
ed in this state which, at the very outset, arbitrarily denies to indi-
viduals the right to pursue a lawful business or occupation.
The difference between signs advertising business conducted or
products sold on the premises and those which do not is one of
degree. In the former instance, the proprietor of the business or
the owner of the market erects or causes his own signs to be
erected. In the latter case, the proprietor of the business or the
owner of the market rents advertising space from those engaged
in the business of erecting and renting outdoor advertising signs.
The Denver Sign Code has attempted to distinguish between these
signs.6 4 This distinction may be based on the case of Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc. v. New York.6 5 There is no decision of the
Colorado Supreme Court in point on this matter, but its decisions in
other cases would indicate that the distinction is too trivial to be
sustained.
In Champlin Refining Co. v. Cruse,66 decided in 1946, involving
the mQtor fuel excise tax statute, a ruling of the director of revenue
63 Id. at 162, 27 Pac. at 1012.
64 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code, § 508.6-10 (2).
65 336 U.S. 106 (1948).





that a two per cent allowance to cover losses caused by evaporation
and spillage should be allowed on fuel shipments from a refinery
but not on fuel shipped from a bulk station, was held unconstitu-
tional. In that decision, the Supreme Court of Colorado, citing other
authorities, said in part:
" 'Equal protection in its guaranty of like treatment to
all similarly situated permits classification which is reason-
able and not arbitrary and which is based upon substantial
differences having a reasonable relation to the objects or
persons dealt with and to the public purpose sought to be
achieved by the legislation involved.... In all cases, how-
ever, where a classification is made for the purpose of con-
ferring a special privilege on a class, there must be some
good and valid reason why that particular class should
alone be the recipient of the benefit .... In cases involving
the equal protection clause of the Constitution, the funda-
mental principle involved in classification is that it shall
meet the requirement that it must affect alike all persons
in the same class and under similar conditions.' "61
There is no essential difference between a sign which says,
"Coca-Cola sold here" and an adjacent sign which says, "Coca-Cola
sold next door." Yet, under the Denver Sign Code,68 it is the invisi-
ble property line between the signs, and not the public welfare,
which renders one sign legal and the other illegal.
Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court, as if to emphasize its
concern over the pressures for further restrictions upon the use and
enjoyment of private property, said in the 1949 case of Jones v.
Board of Adjustment:69
"We consider briefly some basic fundamentals. The
right to the use and enjoyment of property for lawful pur-
poses is the very essence of the incentive to property owner-
ship. The right to thus use property is a property right
fully protected by the due process clause of the federal and
state Constitutions. The use to which an owner may put
his property is subject to a proper exercise of the police
power.... Thus, under the police power, zoning ordinances
are upheld imposing limitations upon the use of land, pro-
vided, however, that the regulations are reasonable, and
provided further that the restrictions in fact have a sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, or general
welfare.
7 0
"Moreover we are confronted with a further and all-
important legal principle, which is that rule which requires
a strict construction of such an ordinance in favor of the
right of a property owner to an unrestricted use of his
property. We stated in Chamberlain v. Roberts, 81 Colo.
23, 253 Pac. 27: '. . . We consider the rule that the scope of
an ordinance restricting one's powers over his own property
67 Id. at 333-34, 173 P.2d at 215-16.
68 Denver, Colo. Rev. Municipal Code, § 508.6-10(2).
69 119 Colo. 420, 204 P.2d 560 (1949).
70 Id. at 427, 204 P.2d at 563-64.
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ought not to be extended, but rather restricted by inter-
pretation.' -1
Colorado is a tourist state. Not every one of its scenic or recrea-
tional areas is adjacent to a main highway. Legislation which dis-
tinguishes between signs advertising the product sold or the business
conducted on the premises on which the sign is located and signs
which do not, harms our tourist industry.7 2 Such legislation grants
a preference to those segments of the industry which are located on
main highways and discriminates against those which are not so
favorably situated. Legislation which attempts to distinguish be-
tween signs as accessory to a particular business and the business of
erecting and renting outdoor signs, does a great disservice to the
tourists. Other forms of advertising attempt to direct a tourist to a
particular place by publicizing the address of such place. Frequently
a strange address is meaningless to the tourist, but there is no mis-
taking the simplicity or directness of an outdoor sign which adver-
tises a place of rest or refreshment so many miles distant, with an
arrow or other appropriate directional sign pointing the way.
It would seem from the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Colorado noted above, that a law which prohibits billboards and
outdoor advertising in the commercial and industrial areas of Colo-
rado is unconstitutional. Additionally, it would seem that court
approval would be denied legislation such as Senate Bill 150,71
which, under the pretext of regulation, prohibits all but a few types
of signs along the interstate and primary highways in Colorado.
What may evolve from present discussion on this subject is
legislation similar to that proposed by the advertising industry in
House Bill 469.74 However, before any remedial legislation can be
enacted, the extremists on both sides-those who would prohibit all
outdoor signs and those who profess to see in any sign legislation
the opening wedge for the supervision and control of all rural
activities-must face realities. It is ironic that these opposing
groups have in the past successfully joined efforts to defeat more
effective and workable sign legislation in Colorado.
71 Id. at 429, 204 P.2d at 564-65.
72 E.g., Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. §131 (1958); Denver, Colo. Rev. Municipal Code, §
508.6-10 (2).
73 42d Gen. Assembly of Colo., 1st Sess. (1959).
74 42d Gen. Assembly of Colo., 1st Sess. (1959).
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